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Category:   Application (Generic)  >   Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC) Vendors:
Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC) Buffer Overflow in Processing PKCS Data Lets Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Code
SecurityTracker Alert ID:  1019690
SecurityTracker URL:
CVE Reference:   CVE-2008-1552   (Links to External Site)
Updated:  Apr 1 2008
Original Entry Date:  Mar 26 2008
Impact:   Execution of arbitrary code via network, User access via network
Fix Available:  Yes  Vendor Confirmed:  Yes  
Version(s): Server 1.1.1 and prior, client 1.1.3 and prior
Description:   A vulnerability was reported in Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC). A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system.

A remote user can send specially crafted PKCS data to trigger a buffer overflow and execute arbitrary code on the target system. The code will run with the privileges of the target service.

A remote client or remote server can trigger the overflow.

Core Security Technologies reported this vulnerability.

The vendor was notified on March 19, 2008.

The original advisory is available at:

Impact:   A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system.
Solution:   The vendor has issued a fix (server 1.1.2, client 1.1.4).
Vendor URL: (Links to External Site)
Cause:   Boundary error
Underlying OS:  Linux (Any), UNIX (Any)

Message History:   None.

 Source Message Contents

Subject:  CORE-2007-1212: SILC pkcs_decode buffer overflow

Hash: SHA1

      Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory

SILC pkcs_decode buffer overflow

*Advisory Information*

Title: SILC pkcs_decode buffer overflow
Advisory ID: CORE-2007-1212
Advisory URL:
Date published: 2008-03-25
Date of last update: 2008-03-25
Vendors contacted: SILC development team
Release mode: Coordinated release

*Vulnerability Information*

Class: Arbitrary memory corruption
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: Yes
Bugtraq ID: 28373	
CVE Name: N/A	

*Vulnerability Description*

Secure Internet Life Conferencing (SILC) is open protocol aimed at
providing encrypted and authenticated communications over an insecure
medium such as the Internet. The SILC application of the same name
implements the protocol as an open source project. SILC is generally
used as a more secure replacement for Internet Relay Chat (IRC) networks
and other open and publicly accessible as well as private instant
messaging networks. A remote buffer overflow vulnerability found in a
library used by both the SILC server and client to process packets
containing cryptographic material may allow an un-authenticated client
to execute arbitrary code on the server with the privileges of the user
account running the server, or a malicious SILC server to compromise
client systems and execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
user account running the SILC client program.

*Vulnerable Packages*

. SILC server up to 1.1.1
. SILC client up to 1.1.3

*Non-vulnerable Packages*

. SILC server 1.1.2
. SILC client 1.1.4

*Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

Fixed versions are available at


This vulnerability was discovered by Core Security Technologies team
"Los Plomeros vs. Blue Demon" during Bugweek 2007: Ariel Waissbein,
Pedro Varangot, Martin Mizrahi, Oren Isacson, Carlos Garcia and Ivan Arce.

*Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

Upon initial connection with a SILC server, mutual authentication
between peers (client, routers and servers) is performed and a key
negotiation protocol is executed to obtain a shared key that is
subsequently used to encrypt communications. While a detailed analysis
of key exchange protocol used by SILC may be appropriate for further
study, what is relevant for the issue at hand is that cryptographic
material is exchanged between peers with data packets encoded using the
PKCS #1 1.5 standard [1].

 SILC's PKCS1 encoding functionality is implemented in the 'silccrypt'
library in file 'silcpkcs1.c'. The specific code to decode PKCS#1
packets is implemented in the 'silc_pkcs1_decode' function shown below:


   SilcBool silc_pkcs1_decode(SilcPkcs1BlockType bt,
   const unsigned char *data,
   SilcUInt32 data_len,
   unsigned char *dest_data,
   SilcUInt32 dest_data_size,
   SilcUInt32 *dest_len)
   int i = 0;

   SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("PKCS#1 decoding, bt %d", bt));

   /* Sanity checks */
   if (!data || !dest_data || dest_data_size < 3 ||
      data[0] != 0x00 || data[1] != (unsigned char)bt) {
    SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Malformed block"));
    return FALSE;

  /* Decode according to block type */
  switch (bt) {
  case SILC_PKCS1_BT_PRV0:
    /* Do nothing */

  case SILC_PKCS1_BT_PRV1:
    /* Verification */
(1) for (i = 2; i < data_len; i++)
      if (data[i] != 0xff)

    /* Decryption */
(2) for (i = 2; i < data_len; i++)
      if (data[i] == 0x00)

  /* Sanity checks */
(3) if (data[i++] != 0x00) {
    SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Malformed block"));
    return FALSE;
  if (i - 1 < SILC_PKCS1_MIN_PADDING) {
    SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Malformed block"));
    return FALSE;
  if (dest_data_size < data_len - i) {
    SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Destination buffer too small"));
    return FALSE;

  /* Copy the data */
(4) memcpy(dest_data, data + i, data_len - i);

  /* Return data length */
  if (dest_len)
    *dest_len = data_len - i;

  return TRUE;

- -----------/

 In the above code, a maliciously forged data packet with valid PKCS#1
encoding of all bytes set to '0xff' or non-'0x00' when transmitting
private ('BT_PRIV1') or public ('BT_PUB') key material (respectively)
will make the execution flow to exit the loops at '(1)' and '(2)' with
the value of the unsigned integer variable 'i' set to 'data_len'. Next,
at '(3)' the same variable 'i' is incremented by one and thus set to
'data_len+1'. A carefully crafted packet that passes the sanity check in
'(3)' will eventually cause memory corruption due to an integer overflow
in the third argument passed in the 'memcpy()' function call at '(4)'.
Since 'i' is set to 'datalen+1' the 'data_len - i 'expression used to
calculate the value of the third argument (amount of bytes to be copied
from the source buffer) will evaluate to '-1' causing the process memory
to be overwritten due to a Unsigned to Signed conversion error [2].
Exploitation of this vulnerability leads to a direct Denial of Service
to the vulnerable program or to arbitrary code execution on the
vulnerable system with the privileges of the SILC program (either the
client or the server) being attacked.

*Report Timeline*

. 2008-03-19: Initial notification sent to the SILC project.
. 2008-03-20: SILC project team acknowledges the bug and patches their
source tree [3].
. 2008-03-20: Core confirms the SILC project the advisory will be
published on March 25th.


[1] PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5
[2] Unsigned to Signed Conversion Error - Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) Definition :

*About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:

*About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help
security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a
proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship
product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing
enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,
endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are
exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security
investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security
Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class
security consulting services, including penetration testing and software
security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core
Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at


The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2008 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2008 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely
provided that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit
is given.

*GPG/PGP Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at

Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla -



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