SecurityTracker.com
Keep Track of the Latest Vulnerabilities
with SecurityTracker!
    Home    |    View Topics    |    Search    |    Contact Us    |   

SecurityTracker
Archives


 
Sign Up
Sign Up for Your FREE Weekly SecurityTracker E-mail Alert Summary
Instant Alerts
Buy our Premium Vulnerability Notification Service to receive customized, instant alerts
Affiliates
Put SecurityTracker Vulnerability Alerts on Your Web Site -- It's Free!
Partners
Become a Partner and License Our Database or Notification Service
Report a Bug
Report a vulnerability that you have found to SecurityTracker
bugs
@
securitytracker.com






Category:   Application (E-mail Client)  >   Microsoft Outlook Vendors:   Microsoft
Microsoft Outlook S/MIME Processing Lets Remote Users Access Arbitrary URLs
SecurityTracker Alert ID:  1019736
SecurityTracker URL:  http://securitytracker.com/id/1019736
CVE Reference:   CVE-2008-3068   (Links to External Site)
Updated:  Jul 8 2008
Original Entry Date:  Apr 1 2008
Impact:   Host/resource access via network
Exploit Included:  Yes  
Version(s): 2007 (12.0.4518.1014)
Description:   A vulnerability was reported in Microsoft Outlook. A remote user can access arbitrary URLs via the target user's system.

A remote user can create a specially crafted S/MIME signed e-mail message that, when received by the target user, will cause the target user's system to access arbitrary HTTP URLs specified by the certificate.

The access is performed by the Microsoft Cryptographic API via the authorityInfoAccess caIssuers extension.

A remote user may be able to exploit this to conduct port scanning against arbitrary systems.

The vendor was notified on January 11, 2008.

Alexander Klink of Cynops GmbH reported this vulnerability.

The original advisory is available at:

https://www.cynops.de/advisories/AKLINK-SA-2008-002.txt

The general class of attack is described in a white paper, available at:

https://www.cynops.de/techzone/http_over_x509.html

Impact:   A remote user can access arbitrary URLs via the target user's system.
Solution:   No solution was available at the time of this entry.
Vendor URL:  www.microsoft.com/ (Links to External Site)
Cause:   Access control error
Underlying OS:   Windows (Any)

Message History:   None.


 Source Message Contents

Date:  Tue, 01 Apr 2008 11:05:53 +0200
Subject:  [Full-disclosure] HTTP over X.509 - Microsoft Outlook

This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format.

--===============1088033653==
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature";
	micalg=sha1; boundary="------------ms020503040500010800010209"

This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format.

--------------ms020503040500010800010209
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
||| Security Advisory AKLINK-SA-2008-002 |||
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

HTTP over X.509 (S/MIME) - Microsoft Outlook
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

Date released: 01.04.2008
Date reported: 11.01.2008
$Revision: 1.1 $

by Alexander Klink
   Cynops GmbH
   a.klink@cynops.de
   https://www.cynops.de/advisories/AKLINK-SA-2008-002.txt
   (S/MIME signed:=20
https://www.cynops.de/advisories/AKLINK-SA-2008-002-signed.txt)
   https://www.klink.name/security/aklink-sa-2008-002-outlook-smime.txt

Vendor: Microsoft
Product: Outlook
Type of vulnerability: design problem
Class: remote
Status: unpatched
Severity: moderate
Releases known to be affected: Outlook 2007 (12.0.4518.1014)
Releases known NOT to be affected: none

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Background:

S/MIME (Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) is a standard
for public key encryption and signing of e-mail based on X.509 certificat=
es.
X.509 certificates allow a number of extension which specify URIs for
additional information regarding the certificate - for example a location=

where to download the issuer certificate(s). For details see RFC 3851/385=
0.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Overview:

When receiving an S/MIME-signed email, Outlook attempts to
use the additional URIs contained in the certificate to download
information relevant for the verification of the certificate. It
will automatically send out HTTP requests to any location that
is reachable from the client - which might include networks previously
unreachable to an attacker.

Results are unnoticed access to both external or internal webservers,
which in turn could be attacked using other vectors and - in the simplest=

case - a "reading confirmation", which is often undesired by the
recipient as well (for example if the sender is a spammer).

For an overview of this class of attacks, see the =AAHTTP over X.509=B4
whitepaper at https://www.cynops.de/techzone/http_over_x509.html.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Technical details:

For an introduction to the technical details, please see the whitepaper.
In this particular case, Microsoft Crypto API handles the
authorityInfoAccess caIssuers extension. The HTTP requests are sent
out as soon as the e-mail is opened in the preview pane.

The Microsoft Crypto API accepts up to five CA Issuer URIs in the
given certificate which may be up to 8 kibibit each (so there is
enough space for a potential attack payload). Contrary to the RFC,
it only accepts HTTP URIs. The Crypto API connects to arbitrary
TCP ports (both privileged and unprivileged) specified in the HTTP
URI.

In one test, the attempt to connect to a running machine
(more or less regardless whether the particular requested port is
open or not) took about 3 seconds and attempting to connect to
an unreachable machine took about 10-16 seconds. If this could
be confirmed to be always the case (some preliminary tests indicated
otherwise), this would allow one to scan for internal hosts via mail
(at the great speed of two hosts per opened mail - it is not as fast as
PortBunny, granted).

In yet undetermined intervals, it also seems to occasionally try
to get the CA issuer certificates again, leading to more HTTP requests.

Also to be noted is that the certificate validation takes place even if t=
he
S/MIME signature itself is invalid - this means than a clever spammer
would not even have to burn CPU cycles on creating correct signatures.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Proof of Concept:

To receive such an S/MIME-signed email that triggers a HTTP request
and to verify that this request reaches an outside server, send a
blank email to smime-http@klink.name.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Communication:

11.01.2008, 17:20 UTC:
    Contacted secure@microsoft.com with information, advisory
    draft (in an S/MIME-encrypted mail) and an example mail.

11.01.2008, 18:30 and 18:49 UTC:
    The example mail triggers HTTP requests from 131.107.0.[104|75]
    with a user agent of "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.3790.3959".

11.01.2008, 21:54 UTC:
    Nate from Microsoft replies with case number (7897) and case manager
    (Geoff). The original mail is fullquoted in this unencrypted reply -
    why did I bother to install their certificate again?

14.01.2008, 17:33 UTC:
    The example mail triggers more HTTP requests from 131.107.0.103,
    this time with a user agent of "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.2600.2180".=


31.01.2008/01.02.2008:
    The example mail regularly triggers HTTP requests from 207.46.55.29,
    with user agents of
      "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.2600.2180"
      "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.2600.3285",
      "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.2600.3297",
      "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.3790.1830",
      "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.3790.3959" and
      "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/6.0",

01.02.2008, 00:14 UTC:
    Geoff replies to let me know they are working on it (yes, I can see
    that :-). Dave and a few additional teams are assisting with the
    investigation of the issue, no requests for additional information,
    they will stay in contact within the next few weeks to provide me
    with an update. The original report is again sent along unencrypted
    and fullquoted.
  =20
February/March 2008:
    The occasional Microsoft HTTP request appears in the webserver logfil=
es

18.03.2008:
    Requested update on the issue, informed them that Office 2007 is
    vulnerable to the same problem as well (as are signed executables,
    but the signature is not checked automatically) and IPSec does not
    seem to be vulnerable.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Solution:

None so far.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Workarounds:

- limit Outlook's ability to do HTTP requests, for example by setting an
  invalid proxy in the internet options. If possible, filter outgoing
  HTTP requests with a user-agent matching "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/*"

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Why this advisory has no CVE ID:

Normally, I make sure every advisory I release has a CVE ID to ensure tha=
t
the issue can be identified without doubt. In the past, I have been
assigned CVE IDs directly and promptly by Steve Christey of MITRE.
The communication in this case went like this:

17.01.2008: contacted Steve Christey with the question on how to handle
            CVEs for a generic issue in an RFC that is vulnerable in
            a specific implementation.
01.02.2008: contact Steve again to ask for an update
01.02.2008: Steve replies saying that he must have missed the first
            email and says:
 | This can be a tough one for CVE, but if it's a fundamental design prob=
lem
 | in a single RFC, and *any* conformant implementation will have the iss=
ue,
 | then it gets a single CVE.
02.02.2008: Updated Steve with details on the vulnerability
07.02.2008: Contacted Steve again for an update
26.02.2008: Contacted Steve again with the explicit wish for CVE IDs
            for the issues in Outlook, Windows Live Mail and Office 2007
28.02.2008: Contacted Steve again asking for the assignment of the CVE ID=
s
28.02.2008: Contacted cve@mitre.org as well in case Steve is no longer th=
e
            correct contact

 >From what I read on the CVE website, it looks like Microsoft assigns
the CVE IDs for their own issues themselves, but they don't talk to me
very much either. I like the CVE idea and would like to use CVE IDs
whenever possible, but someone would have to answer my mails for that.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Credits:

- Alexander Klink, Cynops GmbH (discovery)

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Thanks to:

- Philipp S=FCdmeyer for the help in trying out the first attacks


--=20
Dipl.-Math. Alexander Klink | IT-Security Engineer |    a.klink@cynops.de=

 mobile: +49 (0)178 2121703 |          Cynops GmbH | http://www.cynops.de=

----------------------------+----------------------+---------------------=

      HRB 7833, Amtsgericht | USt-Id: DE 213094986 |     Gesch=E4ftsf=FCh=
rer:
     Bad Homburg v. d. H=F6he |                      |      Martin Bartos=
ch



--------------ms020503040500010800010209
Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
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--------------ms020503040500010800010209--


--===============1088033653==
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
--===============1088033653==--

 
 


Go to the Top of This SecurityTracker Archive Page





Home   |    View Topics   |    Search   |    Contact Us

Copyright 2014, SecurityGlobal.net LLC