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(IBM Issues Fix) BIND 8 Transaction ID Generation Algorithm Lets Remote Users Conduct DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks
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SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1018874 |
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SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1018874
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CVE Reference:
CVE-2007-2930
(Links to External Site)
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Date: Oct 31 2007
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Impact:
Modification of user information
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Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes
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Version(s): 8
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Description:
A vulnerability was reported in BIND 8. A remote user can conduct DNS cache poisoning attacks.
A remote user can poison the cache of any BIND 8 server conducting caching due to a weakness in the transaction ID generation algorithm. A remote user can observe a few consecutive transaction ID values from the target DNS server to predict the next value.
The exploit method is different from that of the BIND 9 DNS cache poisoning attacks.
The vendor was notified on July 26, 2007.
The original advisory is available at:
http://www.trusteer.com/docs/bind8dns.html
Amit Klein of Trusteer reported this vulnerability.
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Impact:
A remote user can poison the cache of the target DNS caching server.
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Solution:
IBM has issued a fix.
For 5.2.0: IZ05609
For 5.3.0: IZ05686
The IBM advisory is available at:
http://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/set2/subscriptions/pqvcmjd?mode=18&ID=3974
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Vendor URL: www.isc.org (Links to External Site)
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Cause:
Randomization error
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Underlying OS:
UNIX (AIX)
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Message History:
This archive entry is a follow-up to the message listed below.
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Source Message Contents
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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2007 17:08:32 -0500
Subject: IBM AIX
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
IBM SECURITY ADVISORY
First Issued: Mon Oct 29 11:36:03 CDT 2007
===============================================================================
VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
VULNERABILITY: AIX BIND 8 remote DNS cache poisoning
PLATFORMS: AIX 5.2, 5.3
SOLUTION: Apply the APAR, interim fix or workaround as described
below.
THREAT: DNS cache may be poisoned due to cryptographically
weak DNS query IDs.
CERT VU Number: 927905
CVE Number: CVE-2007-2930
===============================================================================
DETAILED INFORMATION
I. OVERVIEW
Berkeley Internet Name Domain 8 (BIND 8) is a Domain Name System
(DNS) distribution from the Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) and
it is included with AIX 5.2 and 5.3. The primary fileset for the
AIX BIND 8 system is 'bos.net.tcp.server'. The named8 command
provided by this fileset contains a DNS cache poisoning
vulnerability.
II. DESCRIPTION
The ISC has issued a patch for a security vulnerability in BIND 8
that can be exploited by a remote attacker to predict the DNS
query IDs and poison the DNS cache.
For more details please visit:
http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/bind-security.php
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/927905
The following 'bos.net.tcp.server' command is vulnerable:
/usr/sbin/named8
III. IMPACT
From the ISC BIND advisory:
ISC (Internet Systems Consortium) BIND 8 generates
cryptographically weak DNS query IDs which could allow a
remote attacker to poison DNS caches.
This bug only affects outgoing queries, generated by BIND 8 to
answer questions as a resolver, or when it is looking up data
for internal uses, such as when sending NOTIFYs to slave name
servers.
The DNS query id generation is vulnerable to analysis which
provides a high chance of guessing the next query id. This can
be used to perform cache poisoning by an attacker.
IV. PLATFORM VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
To determine if your system is vulnerable, run the following
command:
# lslpp -l bos.net.tcp.server
The following fileset levels are vulnerable:
AIX Fileset AIX Level Lower Level Upper Level
----------------------------------------------------------------
bos.net.tcp.server 5.2.0 5.2.0.0 5.2.0.107
bos.net.tcp.server 5.3.0 5.3.0.0 5.3.0.63
NOTE: IBM only supports the latest two releases (AIX 5.2 & 5.3)
and the latest three Technology Levels (AIX 5.2 TL08, TL09, TL10 &
AIX 5.3 TL04, TL05, TL06). Affected customers are urged to
upgrade to the latest applicable Technology Level and Service
Pack.
V. SOLUTIONS
A. APARS
IBM provides the following fixes:
AIX Level APAR number Availability
--------------------------------------------------------------------
5.2.0 IZ05609 10/31/2007
5.3.0 IZ05686 11/27/2007
Subscribe to the APARs here:
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ05609
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ05686
By subscribing, you will receive periodic email alerting you
to the status of the APAR, and a link to download the fix once
it becomes available.
AIX Version 5 APARs can be downloaded from:
http://www.ibm.com/servers/eserver/support/unixservers/aixfixes.html
NOTE: Affected customers are urged to upgrade to the latest
applicable Technology Level and Service Pack.
B. INTERIM FIXES
Interim fixes are available. The interim fix can be
downloaded via ftp from:
ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/bind8_ifix.tar
The link above is to a tar file containing this signed
advisory, interim fix packages, and PGP signatures for each
package. The interim fixes below include prerequisite
checking. This will enforce the correct mapping between the
fixes and AIX Technology Levels.
AIX Fileset AIX Release & Interim fix
Technology Level
-----------------------------------------------------------------
bos.net.tcp.server 5200-08 IZ05609_08.071004.epkg.Z
bos.net.tcp.server 5200-09 IZ05609_09.071004.epkg.Z
bos.net.tcp.server 5200-10 IZ05609_10.071004.epkg.Z
bos.net.tcp.server 5300-04 IZ05686_04.071004.epkg.Z
bos.net.tcp.server 5300-05 IZ05686_05.071004.epkg.Z
bos.net.tcp.server 5300-06 IZ05686_06.071004.epkg.Z
IMPORTANT: If possible, it is recommended that a mksysb backup
of the system be created. Verify it is both bootable and
readable before proceeding.
These interim fixes have not been fully regression tested;
thus, IBM does not warrant the fully correct functionality of
the interim fix.
Verify you have retrieved the fixes intact:
The checksums below were generated using the "sum", "cksum",
"csum -h MD5" (md5sum), and "csum -h SHA1" (sha1sum) commands
and are as follows:
sum filename
------------------------------------
09554 363 IZ05609_08.071004.epkg.Z
07431 363 IZ05609_09.071004.epkg.Z
59126 363 IZ05609_10.071004.epkg.Z
61305 357 IZ05686_04.071004.epkg.Z
09842 358 IZ05686_05.071004.epkg.Z
65177 358 IZ05686_06.071004.epkg.Z
cksum filename
------------------------------------------
1103748518 370805 IZ05609_08.071004.epkg.Z
3726399662 370839 IZ05609_09.071004.epkg.Z
2351752494 370849 IZ05609_10.071004.epkg.Z
1222974830 364571 IZ05686_04.071004.epkg.Z
2973908879 366087 IZ05686_05.071004.epkg.Z
2649144716 366299 IZ05686_06.071004.epkg.Z
csum -h MD5 (md5sum) filename
----------------------------------------------------------
ad2c0e57d9f6baf99ba5d9a14d0542b8 IZ05609_08.071004.epkg.Z
77191a7a3a0b82ff004455c7c593b529 IZ05609_09.071004.epkg.Z
1d4b11f1762db7b5fda0bba808450a8a IZ05609_10.071004.epkg.Z
fa5390aa8faa534d830d42c698996cc9 IZ05686_04.071004.epkg.Z
1d018d8afac51e4df431f6ffbb129d9b IZ05686_05.071004.epkg.Z
9dd3ceeb75941910bada83f3cc921a71 IZ05686_06.071004.epkg.Z
csum -h SHA1 (sha1sum) filename
------------------------------------------------------------------
c86cc7ffe6c9e9ee249103c9fee19d90dcf31eed IZ05609_08.071004.epkg.Z
83560428fadfa7f8b6c7a88b026b84ea6a7a73d5 IZ05609_09.071004.epkg.Z
6efea18713bc73e1783edefad84c81baeb448093 IZ05609_10.071004.epkg.Z
81a7ccecb99b38da3917c3153bbd46c025897b2a IZ05686_04.071004.epkg.Z
41d201733173a91e72fb4c0e20c5e05dc87ce804 IZ05686_05.071004.epkg.Z
cca727ef8189f39924ab7896f60262402797b19b IZ05686_06.071004.epkg.Z
To verify the sums, use the text of this advisory as input to
csum, md5sum, or sha1sum. For example:
csum -h SHA1 -i Advisory.asc
md5sum -c Advisory.asc
sha1sum -c Advisory.asc
These sums should match exactly. The PGP signatures in the
compressed tarball and on this advisory can also be used to
verify the integrity of the various files they correspond to.
If the sums or signatures cannot be confirmed, double check
the command results and the download site address. If those
are OK, contact IBM AIX Security at
security-alert@austin.ibm.com and describe the discrepancy.
C. INTERIM FIX INSTALLATION
These packages use the new Interim Fix Management Solution to
install and manage interim fixes. More information can be
found at:
http://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/set2/sas/f/aix.efixmgmt/home.html
To preview an epkg interim fix installation execute the
following command:
# emgr -e ipkg_name -p # where ipkg_name is the name of the
# interim fix package being previewed.
To install an epkg interim fix package, execute the following
command:
# emgr -e ipkg_name -X # where ipkg_name is the name of the
# interim fix package being installed.
The "X" flag will expand any filesystems if required.
VI. WORKAROUNDS
If you are running BIND 8 there are no known workarounds. If the
service is not needed and is running, shut it down.
VII. OBTAINING FIXES
AIX Version 5 APARs can be downloaded from:
http://www.ibm.com/servers/eserver/support/unixservers/aixfixes.html
Security related Interim Fixes can be downloaded from:
ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security
VIII. CONTACT INFORMATION
If you would like to receive AIX Security Advisories via email,
please visit:
http://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/set2/subscriptions/pqvcmjd
Comments regarding the content of this announcement can be
directed to:
security-alert@austin.ibm.com
To request the PGP public key that can be used to communicate
securely with the AIX Security Team you can either:
A. Send an email with "get key" in the subject line to:
security-alert@austin.ibm.com
B. Download the key from a PGP Public Key Server. The key ID is:
0xA6A36CCC
Please contact your local IBM AIX support center for any
assistance.
eServer is a trademark of International Business Machines
Corporation. IBM, AIX and pSeries are registered trademarks of
International Business Machines Corporation. All other trademarks
are property of their respective holders.
IX. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This vulnerability was reported by ISC who credit Amit Klein from
Trusteer (http://www.trusteer.com/).
http://www.trusteer.com/docs/bind8dns.html
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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