Symantec Anti Virus Internal LiveUpdate Feature Discloses Passwords to Local Users
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1014834|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1014834
(Links to External Site)
Updated: Sep 3 2005|
Original Entry Date: Sep 1 2005
Disclosure of authentication information, User access via network|
Vendor Confirmed: Yes Exploit Included: Yes |
Version(s): 9.0.1.x and 9.0.4.x; (LiveUpdate 2.7)|
A vulnerability was reported in Symantec Anti Virus Corporate Edition. A local user can obtain usernames and passwords.|
When the system is configured to use an internal LiveUpdate server (instead of Symantec's LiveUpdate server), the system will log server information to a local file. This information includes the username and password required to access the LiveUpdate server.
The log file is 'C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Symantec\LiveUpdate\Log.Liveupdate'.
A local user can view the log file to obtain the username and password.
LiveUpdate 2.7 is affected. Versions 2.5 and 2.6 are not affected.
golovast at gmail.com reported this vulnerability.
A local user can obtain the username and password to access the LiveUpdate server.|
The vendor has issued a fix for the affected LiveUpdate 2.7 client, available at:|
Vendor URL: www.symantec.com/ (Links to External Site)
Access control error|
|Underlying OS: Windows (Any)|
Source Message Contents
Date: 31 Aug 2005 17:35:45 -0000|
Subject: Vulnerability in Symantec Anti Virus Corporate Edition v9.x
The vulnerability has been identified and confirmed in versions 9.0.1.x and 9.0.4.x. I am fairly certain that it exists in all releases
of version 9 and possibly other versions as well.
Essentially, the program can be configured to receive updates via Symantec's or an Internal Live update server. If it is configured
to receive updates from an internal server, information such as : server name, IP address, subnet, subnet mask, connection protocol,
username and password has to be entered.
This information gets stored in "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Symantec\LiveUpdate\Settings.LiveUpdate" file
and it does store the username and password in an encrypted format.
The vulnerability shows itself when the server actually gets the updates from the LiveUpdate server. The logging information about
the transaction gets written to "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Symantec\LiveUpdate\Log.Liveupdate" file.
In that file, regardless of whether the update was successful or not, username and password that are used to connect to the Internal
LiveUpdate server are available in clear text.
8/24/2005, 17:28:14 PM GMT -> Progress Update: DOWNLOAD_SEGMENT_BATCH_START: Downloading segmented file 1124829658jtun_ennluxdb.x86.full.zip
(size 12401134) instead of update file http://domain\username:*******@x.x.x.x/1124829658jtun_ennluxdb.x86 (size 18047217)
8/31/2005, 0:51:43 AM GMT -> Progress Update: DOWNLOAD_SEGMENT_FILE_START: Downloading segment file http://username:******@x.x.x.x/segments/1125123146jtun_ennluxdb.x86.seg1.zip
instead of update 1125123146jtun_ennluxdb.x86: file size 3584000
8/31/2005, 0:51:43 AM GMT -> Progress Update: DOWNLOAD_FILE_START: URL: "http://username:******@x.x.x.x/segments/1125123146jtun_ennluxdb.x86.seg1.zip",
Estimated Size: 3584000, Destination Folder: "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Symantec\LiveUpdate\Downloads"
This can be exploited in a variety of ways. Most obvious is elevation of privileges. Someone can have access with limited permission
to login to a server in a low security zone. They will be able to access the log file, since it is located in the "C:\Documents and
Settings\All Users\....\.." directory, which is available to all users. A username and password to a service account or a domain
account on the Internal LiveUpdate server can be obtained and used to gain access to that server or other servers in a different