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Category:   Application (Generic)  >   Gzip Vendors:   GNU [multiple authors]
Gzip zgrep Implementation May Let Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Commands
SecurityTracker Alert ID:  1013928
SecurityTracker URL:
CVE Reference:   CAN-2005-0758   (Links to External Site)
Date:  May 10 2005
Impact:   Execution of arbitrary code via network, User access via network
Fix Available:  Yes  Vendor Confirmed:  Yes  
Version(s): 1.2.4
Description:   A vulnerability was reported in gzip in the zgrep implementation. A remote user may be able to cause arbitrary commands to be executed.

The zgrep code does not properly validate user-supplied arguments. If arguments originate from an untrusted source, then a user may be able to cause arbitrary commands to be executed on the target system.

The flaw resides in ''.

Impact:   A remote user may be able to cause arbitrary commands to be executed.
Solution:   A patch for '' is available in the following bug report:

Vendor URL: (Links to External Site)
Cause:   Input validation error
Underlying OS:   Linux (Any), UNIX (Any)

Message History:   None.

 Source Message Contents

Date:  Tue, 10 May 2005 00:31:50 -0400
Subject:  [none]

This old issue seems unfixed in our zgrep.

> zgrep contains the following gem:
> for i do
> [snip]
>      if test $with_filename -eq 1; then
>        sed_script="s|^[^:]*:|${i}:|"
>      else
>        sed_script="s|^|${i}:|"
>      fi
>      $grep $opt "$pat" | sed "$sed_script"
> [snip]
> done
> Aside of the correctness issues (try to use zgrep on files with e.g. '&' in
> names), it leads to obvious fun when zgrep arguments had been obtained
> by globbing in an untrusted place.  Even with standard sed we have at
> least ;w<filename>; to deal with; for GNU sed there's also ;e; on top
> of that (execute the contents of pattern space).  bzgrep is no better -
> it's based on zgrep.
> AFAICS, there are two solutions - one is to do what *BSD had done and
> make grep(1) use zlib and libbz; then zgrep become links to
> grep.  Another is to quote \, |, ; and newlines, which means extra
> invocation of sed(1)...

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