Mitel 3300 ICP PBX Predictable Session IDs on the Web Interface Let Remote Users Hijack Sessions
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SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1013321 |
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SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1013321
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CVE Reference:
CAN-2004-0944
(Links to External Site)
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Date: Feb 28 2005
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Impact:
User access via network
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Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes Exploit Included: Yes
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Version(s): Model 3300 ICP (prior to 4.2.2.11)
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Description:
A vulnerability was reported in the Mitel 3300 ICP PBX in the web interface. A remote user can hijack sessions.
The web interface uses a predictable session ID number for authentication purposes. A remote user can guess the session ID number and set a 'parentsessionid' cookie to the guessed value to hijack the specified session.
Only 50 active sessions IDs are permitted at one time, limiting the range that the remote user must guess.
The vendor was notified on August 27, 2004.
Stephen de Vries of Corsaire reported this vulnerability.
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Impact:
A remote user can hijack sessions on the web interface.
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Solution:
The vendor has released a fixed version (4.2.2.11).
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Vendor URL: www.mitel.com/DocController?documentId=9555&c=9511&sc=9514 (Links to External Site)
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Cause:
Authentication error, Randomization error
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Underlying OS:
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Message History:
None.
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Source Message Contents
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Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 17:56:58 -0000
Subject: [VulnWatch] Corsaire Security Advisory - Mitel 3300 ICP web interface session hijacking issue
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-- Corsaire Security Advisory --
Title: Mitel 3300 ICP web interface session hijacking issue
Date: 17.08.04
Application: Mitel Web Management Interface
Environment: Mitel 3300 ICP (prior to 4.2.2.11)
Author: Stephen de Vries [stephen@corsaire.com]
Audience: General distribution
Reference: c040817-002
-- Scope --
The aim of this document is to define a vulnerability in the 3300
Integrated Communication Platform as supplied by Mitel [1], that allows
a remote attacker to hijack legitimate users' web management sessions.
-- History --
Discovered: 17.08.04 (Stephen de Vries)
Vendor notified: 27.08.04
Document released: 28.02.05
-- Overview --
The 3300 ICP [2] provides enterprise IP-PBX capabilities and makes use
of a Web Interface to manage the device. In order to maintain a user
session, the Web Interface generates a unique session ID for each user
after they have successfully authenticated. Once the client has
authenticated, this session ID is used as a shared secret to
authenticate the client to the server for all subsequent requests.
This session ID was found to be trivially predictable and allows
attackers to hijack legitimate users' sessions.
-- Analysis --
The Web Interface on the 3300 ICP generates the session ID after
successful authentication. The HTML page returned after successful
authentication contains Javascript code that sets a cookie with the name
"parentsessionid" to the value of the session ID. By making successive
authentication requests a list of session IDs can be retrieved. A
random sample follows:
parentsessionid=3
parentsessionid=4
parentsessionid=5
parentsessionid=6
parentsessionid=7
parentsessionid=8
parentsessionid=9
parentsessionid=10
parentsessionid=11
parentsessionid=12
It is quite clear that these IDs are sequential. Further investigation
revealed that the Web Interface has an upper limit of 50 active session
IDs. This further reduces the number of IDs that an attacker has to
guess before being able to hijack a user's session.
-- Recommendations --
The vendor has released a revised version of the software that does not
exhibit this issue. This has not been independently verified by
Corsaire.
-- CVE --
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CAN-2004-0944 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardises names for
security problems.
-- References --
[1] http://www.mitel.com
[2] http://www.mitel.com/DocController?documentId=9555&c=9511&sc=9514
-- Revision --
a. Initial release.
b. Minor revision.
-- Distribution --
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Corsaire
accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of
this information.
-- Disclaimer --
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Corsaire
accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of
this information.
-- About Corsaire --
Corsaire are a leading information security consultancy, founded in 1997
in Guildford, Surrey, UK. Corsaire bring innovation, integrity and
analytical rigour to every job, which means fast and dramatic security
performance improvements. Our services centre on the delivery of
information security planning, assessment, implementation, management
and vulnerability research.
A free guide to selecting a security assessment supplier is available at
http://www.penetration-testing.com
Copyright 2004-2005 Corsaire Limited. All rights reserved.
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