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Category:  Application (Generic)  >  PHP Vendors:  PHP Group
PHP posix_access() safe_mode Restrictions Can By Bypass With 'http://' Prefix
SecurityTracker Alert ID:  1020327
SecurityTracker URL:  http://securitytracker.com/id?1020327
CVE Reference:  CVE-2008-2665   (Links to External Site)
Date:  Jun 19 2008
Impact:  Disclosure of system information, Disclosure of user information, Modification of system information, Modification of user information
Exploit Included:  Yes  
Version(s): 5.2.6
Description:  A vulnerability was reported in PHP. A user can bypass safe_mode restrictions.

A user can supply a specially crafted value to the posix_access() function to bypass safe_mode restrictions. A value beginning with the 'http://' prefix can trigger the flaw.

Other functions are affected.

Maksymilian Arciemowicz (cXIb8O3) of SecurityReason.com reported this vulnerability.

Impact:  A user can bypass safe_mode restrictions.
Solution:  No solution was available at the time of this entry.
Vendor URL:  www.php.net/ (Links to External Site)
Cause:  Access control error
Underlying OS:  Linux (Any), UNIX (Any), Windows (Any)
Reported By:  "Maksymilian Arciemowicz" <cxib@securityreason.com>
Message History:   None.


 Source Message Contents

Date:  Wed, 18 Jun 2008 20:05:48 +0200
From:  "Maksymilian Arciemowicz" <cxib@securityreason.com>
Subject:  [Full-disclosure] PHP 5.2.6 posix_access() (posix ext) safe_mode


 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

[PHP 5.2.6 posix_access() (posix ext) safe_mode bypass ]

Author: Maksymilian Arciemowicz (cXIb8O3)
SecurityReason.com
Date:
- - Written: 10.05.2008
- - Public: 17.06.2008

SecurityReason Research
SecurityAlert Id: 54

CVE: CVE-2008-2665
CWE: CWE-264
SecurityRisk: Low

Affected Software: PHP 5.2.6
Advisory URL: http://securityreason.com/achievement_securityalert/54
Vendor: http://www.php.net

- --- 0.Description ---

PHP is an HTML-embedded scripting language. Much of its syntax is borrowed from C, Java and Perl with
a couple of unique PHP-specific features thrown in. The goal of the language is to allow web developers to write dynamically generat
ed pages quickly. posix_access ? Determine accessibility of a file SYNOPSIS: bool posix_access ( string $file [, int $mode ] ) http://pl2.php.net/manual/pl/function.posix-access.php !!! WARNING !!! IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXPLOIT MORE FUNCTIONS WITH http: PREFIX. SECURITYREASON WILL NOT LIST ALL VULNERAB
LE FUNCTIONS - --- 1. PHP 5.2.6 posix_access() safe_mode bypass --- Let's see to posix_access() function - --- PHP_FUNCTION(posix_access) long mode = 0; int filename_len, ret; char *filename, *path; if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &filename, &filename_l
en, &mode) == FAILURE) { RETURN_FALSE; } path = expand_filepath(filename, NULL TSRMLS_CC); if (!path) { POSIX_G(last_error) = EIO; RETURN_FALSE; } if (php_check_open_basedir_ex(path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) || (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid_ex(filename, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_DIR, CHECKUID_
NO_ERRORS)))) { efree(path); POSIX_G(last_error) = EPERM; RETURN_FALSE; } ret = access(path, mode); efree(path); if (ret) { POSIX_G(last_error) = errno; RETURN_FALSE; } RETURN_TRUE; - --- var_dump(posix_access("http://../../../etc/passwd"))==True var_dump(posix_access("/etc/passwd"))==False Why? Because path = expand_filepath(filename, NULL TSRMLS_CC); will change "http://../../../etc/passw
d" to path=/etc/passwd (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid_ex(filename, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_DIR, CHECKUID_NO_
ERRORS))) will check realy path "http://../../../etc/passwd". http:// is using in php_checkuid_ex(), so safe_mode is bypassed. !!! WARNING !!! IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXPLOIT MORE FUNCTIONS WITH http: PREFIX. SECURITYREASON WILL NOT LIST ALL VULNERAB
LE FUNCTIONS - --- 2. How to Fix --- Do not use safe_mode as a main safety - --- 3. Greets --- sp3x Infospec schain p_e_a Chujwamwdupe - --- 4. Contact --- Author: SecurityReason [ Maksymilian Arciemowicz ( cXIb8O3 ) ] Email: cxib [at] securityreason [dot] com GPG: http://securityreason.pl/key/Arciemowicz.Maksymilian.gpg http://securityreason.com http://securityreason.pl -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.4 (FreeBSD) iD8DBQFIWCC+W1OhNJH6DMURAsq4AJ0eC1qKOZVOJJB3XDRIhpufNe1qUwCfTWv0 n4Sg31DePRpr4h3PLouKFoA= =6qwD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


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